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Equity, however large its triumphs, has long been trailed by challenges to its
legitimacy. Arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes could easily follow from
doctrines of substantive law, and remedies, that vest great discretion in a judge
and openly invite arguments premised upon moral intuition and conscience.
John Selden, long ago, characterized equity as "roguish" for just this reason, as
an idiosyncratic exercise in measuring justice by the "Chancellor's foot."' The
merger of law and equity in most jurisdictions does not resolve these challenges;
legitimacy remains a question even "[a]s memories of the divided bench, and
familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the past .... "'
The articles in this symposium explore facets of doctrine and practice that
originated with equity, each suggesting an answer to the enduring question of
legitimacy.
One form of legitimacy-a practical workaday sort-arises from settled
practice that creates transparent criteria for decisionmaking; however broadly
stated, if the criteria are explicit, their presence is a constraining force.
Additionally, judges make decisions in a context defined by their membership in
a profession. In this respect the history of equity jurisprudence is informative.
The first influential chancellor in the United States, James Kent in New York,
explained in his extrajudicial writing how he succeeded in bringing order to an
unsettled system and making English authority (in the immediate aftermath of
the War of 1812) palatable to his patriotic colleagues on the bench. Chancellor
Kent described his judicial technique as follows:
My practice was, first, to make myself perfectly and accurately (mathematically
accurately) master of the facts. It was done by abridging the bill, and then the
answers, and then the depositions, and by the time I had done this slow and
tedious process, I was master of the cause and ready to decide it. I saw where
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justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; and then I sat
down to search the authorities until I had examined my books. I might once in
a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I most often found principles
suited to my views of the case; my object was so to discuss a point as never to
be teased with it again, and to anticipate an angry and vexatious appeal to a
popular tribunal by disappointed counsel.'
Chancellor Kent introduced to his court the practice of written opinions-his two
predecessors having produced no written authority ever cited to Kent during his
nine years as Chancellor-with the objective of gaining acquiescence in his
views.4
Kent's emphasis on factual mastery was not unique to the early nineteenth
century. A leading judicial practitioner of equity, William T. Allen, has written
that in his court, the Delaware Court of Chancery, "the particulars of the case,
not radiant legal generalities, are of transcending importance . . ." Professor
Powell's article in this symposium, likewise, emphasizes the factually dense
nature of Judge Benjamin Cardozo's equity opinions.6 Commentators and later
judges may have overlooked this quality, reducing Cardozo's reasoning to mere
slogans, but to Cardozo himself equity's central characteristic was "its ability to
answer 'the call of the occasion'."7 To meet that call, discretionary justice is
grounded in the decisionmaker's conscientious understanding of the controversy.
To be sure, over time a body of written precedents may jeopardize the
court's capacity to respond to each situation alert to its own particularity.
Written justifications for decisions, and abstracts from them, may come to have
lives of their own that impede subsequent decisionmakers' sensitivity to factual
nuance. Chancellor Kent noted that "[a] court of equity becomes, in the lapse
of time, by gradual and almost imperceptible degrees, a court of strict technical
jurisprudence, like a court of law."8 Although Kent seems to have overgeneral-
ized on the basis of contemporary English experience,9 the practical need for
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particular case." Id. Other commentators assess Eldon less favorably. Professor Stone describes his
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Eldon's position was manifest in his invalidation of settlement deeds conditional on future separation,
his opposition to paternal agreements to surrender custody and his fierce cross-examination of petitioners
for Parliamentary divorces, which frightened off petitioners and caused many to abandon their petitions.
Professor Atiyah assigns to Eldon's disposition significant responsibility for the court of chancery's
decline; Eldon procrastinated endlessly and was unwilling to reach final decisions. See PETER S. ATIYAH,
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 392-93 (1979). Eldon's intellectual conservatism led
him to "make a thorough nuisance of himself on the subject of companies," and initially to treat all
companies as illegal monopolies. Id. at 366.
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stability and predictability is to some degree inescapable. Predictability, though,
invites generalizable rules, in turn undermining the narrow and fact-bound nature
of equitable judging. If, as Professor Laycock argues in his symposium article,
the equitable remedies of injunction and specific performance have become
routine in many contexts,10 Chancellor Kent's prediction has to that degree
been vindicated.
Like Kent, Selden has contemporary counterparts. Professor Rowe's article
describes the inhospitable reception met by equitable remedies and concepts of
jurisdiction before the United States Supreme Court in recent public law
cases.1  Selden's sensibility seems especially to animate Justice Scalia. It is
"little if any exaggeration," writes Professor Rowe, to conclude that Justice Scalia
"strives to minimize the scope for judicial discretion.' ' 12 The high degree of
political sensitivity attending federal public law may explain, but not justify, the
recent regression in the Court and its departure from the general developments
explored by Professor Laycock. Paradoxically, of course, discretionary judicial
decisionmaking becomes more unpredictable when the occasions for it are
restricted, while discretion's opponents often stress their concern for lack of
predictability and stability.
The comparative perspective afforded by Justice Gummow's article is helpful
in understanding both these domestic developments and the Australian
framework that Gummow analyzes. In Australia, as in the United States
generally, the injunction is rapidly losing its character as an extraordinary
remedy. 3 The Australian constitution entrenches federal public law jurisdiction
to enjoin officers of the federal government who act or threaten to act illegally;
Australia has no statute barring federal injunctions to stay proceedings in state
court and no judicial doctrine of federal abstention. But the Australian federal
and state constitutions contain no guarantees of a right to jury trial in civil cases
or of freedom of speech or due process; the latter point has limited the occasion
to develop injunctions to regulate and reform the structure of governmental
institutions. 4
Kent's account is that once immersed in the particulars of the parties'
dispute, he "saw where justice lay . . .. " Professor Powell, focusing on Judge
Cardozo's equity decisions delivered a century after Kent's service, notes that
Cardozo "assumed the existence of a moral tradition, within the legal profession
and in society generally," that Cardozo did not see his decisions as matters of
choice at all, but rather as "attempts truthfully to describe and respond to the
situations brought before him."' 5 In our very different world, the bases for
10. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 1993).
11. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity's Triumph in Federal
Public Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 1993).
12. Id. at 118.
13. The Honourable Mr. Justice William Gummow, The Injunction in Aid of Legal Rights-An
Australian Perspective, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1993).
14. Id. at 85.
15. Powell, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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legitimacy are less obvious; many would be skeptical of a judge's ability to
envision justice in the immediate and incontestable sense that Kent probably
meant.
The experience in Delaware suggests two responses, one highly formal and
one more pragmatic. Delaware's second constitution in 1792 established a
separate court of equity, today a flourishing and much-celebrated institution.
Although the court is best known for its adjudication of disputes involving
Delaware corporate law, it has a general equity jurisdiction in which non-
corporate cases are numerically significant. 6  Formal bases for equity's
legitimacy in Delaware are its constitutional grounding and long history.
Professor William T. Quillen's article in this symposium argues that the court's
status as a general equity court with constitutionally vested jurisdiction has
"emboldened its judges in the exercise of power, supplied a permanence which
has enabled its structure to grow, and given a heightened cultural emphasis to
equitable maxims and principles.' 17 Moreover, argues Professor Quillen, equity
works: The Delaware court of chancery resolves complex (as well as simple)
disputes expeditiously, having aired the issues in professional and forthright
manner, and lets the litigants move on18 -at least to an appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court, where the odds of reversal seem pretty low.19
Another earmark of equity jurisprudence identified by Chancellor Allen is
its retrospective not prospective orientation. Having focused on the particulars
of a specific controversy, that is, a judge working in this tradition is more
concerned with achieving justice among the parties to that action than in building
and maintaining a system of general rules justified by its future utility to other
persons.' Equity's concern with relationships of trust and dependency, and its
16. The contribution of the court's general equity jurisdiction to its repute in corporate law is a
significant unexamined question. Varying somewhat over time, though, noncorporate cases, at least in
number, occupy a substantial portion of the docket. See William T. Quillen, A Short History of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792-1992, 45
(1992) (during service of Chancellor Duffy, 1966-1973, 75% of cases on docket involved local Delaware
issues respecting land titles, zoning, picketing in labor disputes and property rights under wills and
trusts); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 683, 691 n.22 (1992) (between 1985 and 1992, 61% of opinions issued by incumbent
chancellor involved corporate law).
As it happens, Delaware chancellors themselves emphasize the professional and personal
satisfaction they obtain from deciding noncorporate cases. Chancellor Duffy's own account emphasizes
land title cases, a will dispute that led to the redesign of funerary statuary, and a guardianship case
involving the ability of a guardian of the person to determine whether to withdraw the life-support
system sustaining his unconscious ward. See Quillen, supra, at 45-46. The incumbent chancellor singles
out a property dispute involving an unconscionable transfer. See Allen, supra note 5, at 17. And
Chancellor Seitz's decisions desegregating educational institutions in Delaware, prior to Brown v. Board
of Education, are characterized as "one of the Court's finest hours" by the incumbent chief justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court. See E. Norman Veasey, The Court of Chancery - The Court of Excellence,
in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792-1992, 12 (1992).
17. Quillen, supra note 16, at 123.
18. Id. at 119.
19. See Massey, supra note 16, for a discussion of the relationship between these two courts in
corporate law disputes.
20. See Allen, supra note 5, at 16.
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creation and enforcement of fiduciary duties-all settings that require a
mechanism to examine the actual use of power or control by one person over
property or another person-explain this emphasis.
The colloquy between Professors Lindgren and English illustrates the ongoing
significance of these questions. Equity's traditional concern with dependent
persons, chiefly exercised through its regulation of guardianships, places in court
many disputes about the termination of life-supporting medical technology.
Professor Lindgren critically examines the standards courts apply in such cases
and advocates as a standard to guide the exercise of judicial discretion, the
adoption of a principle of "death by default."21 Most people, Lindgren argues,
would prefer in stated circumstances that their lives not be artificially prolonged,
a preference manifest in extensive polling data and living wills; in the absence of
evidence that a particular person would have preferred otherwise, courts should
permit life-support to be withdrawn.22 Professor English emphasizes, instead,
the ambiguous and conflicting nature of cases on treatment. 3 As to many of
the circumstances identified by Lindgren, in which most people would prefer
death to life's artificial prolongation, English notes that interpretive questions
will inevitably arise and that certainty in adjudication will be elusive; "in this
area of the law," concludes Professor English, "there can be no simple
solutions."24
The colloquy between Professor Scheppele and her commentator, Chancellor
Allen, reflects a similar debate. Professor Scheppele criticizes the Supreme
Court's recent doctrine defining insider trading, arguing that it is too rigidly
focused on locating a fiduciary relationship and should, instead, reflect the
broader principles earlier developed in equity to require disclosure of informa-
tion to which a person has had privileged access.' Professor Scheppele justifies
her proposal for a broader prohibition on insider trading through an exercise in
contractarian ethics, that is, an effort to discern the rule to which all affected
persons would consent before circumstances of a specific dispute arise.26
Chancellor Allen maintains that Scheppele is insufficiently sensitive to the
context in which most insider trading occurs. Anonymous transactions through
intermediaries on stock exchanges connect buyers and sellers who, otherwise,
have no relationship at all to each other.27 More generally, Allen argues that
Scheppele's contractualist technique is an attempt to objectify what are
inescapably contestable exercises in moral reasoning in the law.2 Instead, when
21. See James Lindgren, Death By Default, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (Summer 1993).
22. Id. at 185-86.
23. See David M. English, Comment: Defining the Right to Die, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255
(Summer 1993).
24. Id.
25. Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 123 (Summer 1993).
26. Id. at 125.
27. William T. Allen, Professor Scheppele's Middle Way: On Minimizing Normativity and
Economics in Securities Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (Summer 1993).
28. Id. at 182.
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confronted with their inevitable responsibility for the interstitial formulation or
modification of rules, courts may "legitimately take fairness concerns directly,
albeit cautiously, into account.,
29
29. Id. at 183.
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